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Abstract In Parts of Classes David Lewis argued that mereology is ‘ontologically
innocent’, mereological notions not incurring additional ontological commitments.
Unfortunately, though, Lewis’s argument for this is not fully spelled out. Here we
use some formal results concerning translations between formal languages to argue
for the ontological innocence of mereology directly.
1 Introduction
On the face of it a theoretical commitment to unrestricted mereological compo-
sition—that any collection of objects, no matter how disparate, has a mereological
fusion—has a steep ontological cost. For example, suppose that there is a cat, Tom,
and a mouse, Jerry. By unrestricted mereological composition we appear to be
committed to the existence of a further entity— their fusion—distinct from either of
them. On the face of it, then, it appears that unrestricted mereological composition
commits us to the existence of additional objects. In response to this kind of
argument Lewis says the following.
To be sure, if we accept mereology, we are committed to the existence of all
manner of mereological fusions. But given a prior commitment to cats, say, a
commitment to cat-fusions is not a further commitment. The fusion is nothing
over and above the cats that compose it. It just is them. They just are it. Take
them together or take them separately, the cats are the same portion of Reality
either way (Lewis 1991, p. 81).
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So, according to Lewis, mereology does not commit us to the existence of
‘additional’ entities such as the fusion of Tom and Jerry: it is, in some sense,
‘‘ontologically innocent’’. Lewis provides some support for this view by pointing
out certain similarities between mereological relations (such as parthood and fusion)
and identity. For example, if you are committed to the existence of an object a, and
a is identical to b then you are not burdened with any additional ontological
commitment to b–b would seem to come as an ontological ‘free lunch’ in the
presence of a prior commitment to a. In fact, Lewis claims that mereological
relations are so closely related to identity that this ontological innocence transfers
over to the mereological relations.1
Lewis’s argument for the ontological innocence of mereology is an argument by
analogy. First we note that identity is ‘‘ontologically innocent’’. Secondly we note
that there are a number of similarities between mereological relations and identity,
such as: unrestricted applicability, uniqueness of applicability, ease of description,
and the co-location of things which they relate. From this we are then meant to
conclude that the mereological relations are also ‘‘ontologically innocent’’. This
argument has one of the usual flaws which arguments by analogy have, namely that
we are given no reason for thinking that similarity in the listed respects is sufficient
for the mereological relations to be ontologically innocent [on which see section 3
of Yi (1999)].2 The argument is made even more vexing in that one of the ways in
which Lewis claims identity and the mereological relations are analogous is
precisely the one under dispute: namely, ontological innocence! What we will do
here is argue that Lewis is indeed correct to think that mereology is ontologically
innocent, using formal methods to provide a more direct argument. Throughout
when we talk of mereology we will mean classical extensional mereology, the
formal theory which combines Lewis’s commitment to universal mereological
composition (that any objects have a fusion), with the extensionality of parthood
(objects with the same parts are identical). Both of these features of classical
extensional mereology will be needed in our argument.
There is a pressing question which we need to settle first, though. Namely, what
exactly is it that we are claiming about mereology—what does Lewis really mean
(or could he mean) by ‘‘ontologically innocent’’?
1 It is somewhat unfortunate that Lewis decided to refer to this thesis as Composition as Identity, given
that he explicitly denies that he is adopting the thesis as it is commonly understood (as in, e.g. Baxter
1988). What Lewis really means by ‘composition as identity’ is that, in some sense, mereological
relations are instances of ‘identity in the broadest sense’, the limiting case of which is ordinary
(numerical) identity (Lewis 1991, p. 84f). For the state of the art concerning the thesis of composition as
identity the reader should consult Cotnoir and Baxter (2014).
2 One could sufficiently strengthen the analogy between mereological relations and identity by giving a
generalisation of identity in plural quantificational terms which has the appropriate formal characteristics
and collapses to identity between objects under certain circumstances. Lewis explicitly points out that he
can see no way to do this, though (cf. Lewis 1991, p. 87). Further difficulties for this line of argument are




Lewis is not explicit about what exactly it takes for a theory to be ontologically
innocent. We are told that plural quantification is ontologically innocent, because it
just gives us a new, primitively plural, way of talking about the first-order domain of
quantification rather than committing us to the existence of exotic plural entities,
classes or sets. By contrast set theory is not ontologically innocent: given a
commitment to an object a we are suddenly committed to a multitude of objects
distinct from a, namely the various sets we can construct out of a, such as fag,
ffagg etc.3 Mereology, though, is meant to be different.
Mereology is innocent in a different way: we have many things, we do
mention one thing that is the many taken together, but this one thing is nothing
different from the many (Lewis 1991, p. 87).
So mereology is different as far as ontological innocence is concerned from both
plural quantification—as there is something (the fusion) which is the many taken
together—and also set theory—as this something is not distinct from the many out
of which it is composed. Now, if we interpret this remark strictly and literally, what
Lewis is saying here cannot be true. After all, as Lewis himself notes in the
paragraph previous to that where the above quote appears, the number of lemons in
the fruit bowl on the table as I write this is four, but the number of their fusion is
one. So there is at least some respect in which the fusion and the fused differ. How,
then, should we understand this claim that mereology is ‘‘ontologically innocent’’?
One way of attempting to cash out this idea is as follows. Let us, following Hodes
(1990), draw a distinction between what a sentence S says exists (its thin
commitments), and what is required for the sentence S to be true, the facts which are
relevant to settling S’s truth-value (its thick commitments). One way of cashing out
what it means for a theory to be ontologically innocent is the following:4
INNOCENCE: a theory T is ontologically innocent regarding the existence of Xs iff
Xs are amongst T’s thin commitments (i.e. it asserts that Xs exist) but not amongst
its thick commitments (i.e. the truth of the theory does not require the existence of
Xs).
For example (approximately speaking) in the case where T is mereology, to show
that mereology is ontologically innocent regarding the existence of mereologically
complex objects (our Xs in this situation) one needs to show that mereologically
complex objects are amongst the thin commitments of mereology, but not among its
thick commitments.5 This characterisation is approximate mostly due to being
slightly too strong, and we’ll qualify this slightly in Sect. 8.
3 Lewis (1991) is an attempt to found set-theory on mereology and plural logic—what Lewis calls
‘Megethology’. Using the resources of Megethology Lewis argues that set-theory can be reduced to the
theory of singletons. We leave it to the interested reader to examine how well Lewis’s megethological
manoeuvres sit with our argument for the ontological innocence of mereology below.
4 According to the following definition, theories which are ontologically innocent regarding the existence
of Xs would seem to count Xs as thin existents in the sense of Linnebo (2012).
5 A referee points out that this definition of ontological innocence may be inadequate because classical
extensional mereology is not a conservative extension of theories of the world which are able to state
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In Hodes (1990) the distinction between thick and thin commitments is
understood as being a distinction pertaining to the syntactic and semantic forms of
sentences under discussion in a particular domain. This is, of course, not the only
way of spelling out something like this distinction, and it will not be ours here.
Suppose that we are dealign with a theory T which is ‘ontologically transparent’—
so it is obvious what its ontological commitments appear to be. Then we will say
that T has a thin commitment to Xs iff there is a truth (and falsity) preserving
translation from T to some other ontologically transparent theory T 0 which is not
committed to Xs. We probably also want to place other requirements on the theories
T and T 0 (for example they should both have plausible metaphysical/ideological
commitments, and perhaps both be able to adequately represent reality).6 Making
use of this distinction allows us to make some sense of what precisely Lewis is
claiming of mereological fusions, especially if we think of the thin commitments of
a sentence as supervening on its thick commitments. It is clear in this case how the
fusions and the fused might then be construed as being the ‘same portion of
Reality’, and in what way fusions are not distinct from the fused. Our proposal will
ultimately be similar to one informally presented by Ted Sider over the course of
trying to determine exactly what talk of fusions being ‘nothing over and above their
parts’ might mean.
[O]ne might construe ‘‘the whole is nothing over and above the parts’’ as
implying that the features of the whole are in some sense nothing over and
above the features of the parts. ... Any irreducibly macroscopic features can be
pinned on relations between the parts, and therefore do not essentially involve
the whole to the exclusion of the parts (Sider 2007, p. 73).
The important question, given the above line of thinking, is how exactly we are
supposed to spell this out.
Footnote 5 continued
constraints on the number of objects which exist. For example, if T is a theory of the world which claims
that there are only two objects then this theory will not be conservatively extended by the theory M of
classical extensional mereology in the sense that there will be sentences solely in the language of T (such
as the claim that there are more than two objects) which are true in T þM but not in T—this being
essentially the point pressed in Comesan˜a (2008). I think there are two issues with this line of argument
against the claim the mereology is ontologically innocent. Firstly, counting objects in the presence of
mereological principles requires some amount of care: for example, we ought to avoid (significant)
overlap between the objects counted in order to avoid double counting. Secondly, and more importantly,
the notion of innocence tracked by conservative extension is far stronger than the notion we have in mind
here. If the addition of mereological principles conservatively extended a theory of the world then, given
that the theory of the world can talk about how many objects there are in its original language, this would
suggest that mereology was ontologically innocent by not bringing with it any ontological commitments
at all, this is essentially the manner in which Lewis claims that plural logic is ontologically innocent.
What is claimed here, though, is that mereology brings with it a commitment to mereologically complex
objects, but that this commitment is ‘thin’ or ‘lightweight’.
6 This is similar to the proposal made in Williams (2012) concerning ‘requirements on reality’. There
‘thick commitments’—Williams’ ‘reality requirements’—are the objects which your metasemantic theory
commits you to. As this reference to metasemantics makes clear, Williams is concerned with an
interesting and sophisticated kind of paraphrase strategy, which the present suggestion should be
distinguished from. Paraphrase strategies, in general, are arguments for not being committed to things, not
for a commitment to them being innocent.
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3 Our Approach in Outline
Our approach will be to show that mereology is ontologically innocent using formal
models. Speaking loosely, we will show that everything which can be said in the
language of classical extensional mereology can be said in a language free of
mereological primitives, and in particular free of quantification over mereological
fusions. To do this we will provide a translation function which maps sentences
from our mereological language to sentences of our non-mereological language.
Thinking of the non-mereological language as being one in which the thick
commitments of our mereological language are best expressed, this will show how
claims that ‘there is a fusion of Tom and Jerry’ only commit us (in the thick sense)
to Tom and Jerry—and thus by INNOCENCE that mereology is ontologically innocent.
As with any formal modelling it will be helpful to make a few simplifying
assumptions in order to make our formal work more tractable. In what follows we
will make the following assumptions:
• Worldbound: we will only be concerned with the actual world (or any single
world) and its denizens.
• No Gunk: we will also assume that there is no atomless gunk in the world under
consideration. That is, every object is composed out of mereological atoms.
• Limitation of Size: we will assume that there are only countably many
mereological atoms.
• Anonomism: we will assume that names and other singular terms are not
necessary for a complete description of the world.
The first assumption serves to allow us to bow out of any debates concerning the
essentiality of mereological composition. This assumption also justifies our
concerning ourselves with purely extensional languages. The third assumption is
important as it allows us to consider slightly more tractable languages in our
translation, as we will discuss in Sect. 4.2.2. The fourth assumption plays a more
subtle and indirect role in what follows. This thesis is argued for explicitly (under
this name) in Karmo (1985), and is a feature of languages which are intended to be
‘purely qualitative’, such as those used in arguments for anti-haecceitism in modal
metaphysics [such as that in Lewis (1986, p. 221)]. Its purpose here is to allow us to
restrict attention to languages which do not contain individual constants or singular
terms. These three assumptions (Worldbound, Limitation of Size, and Anono-
mism) are made purely for the sake of convenience, allowing us to simplify our
formal modelling. How this is so is clarified in our conclusion. The situation
concerning No Gunk is slightly more delicate, though.
No Gunk is probably both the most important, and also most contentious of the
above assumptions, especially given arguments that gunky worlds are possible such
as in Sider (1993). We are not alone in making this assumption (van Inwagen 1990),
which Sider is responding to, makes it also), but the issue is rather delicate. For the
moment we will adopt it nonetheless because of its technical utility. We will return
at the end of the paper, in Sects. 8 and 9, to examine the extent to which our
arguments really do rely on these assumptions.
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4 Two Formal Languages
Before talking about our translation we will first need to introduce the two formal
languages which will be taking centre stage in the result to follow: the first-order
language of mereology, and our ‘flexible infinitary language’.
4.1 Mereology
Let Lm be a first-order language with a distinguished binary predicate ‘Y’ for
parthood. The quantifiers of this language range over, not just the mereological
atoms, but also their fusions. Here we are taking the relation of parthood as our
mereological primitive, although nothing substantial hangs on this choice, as all of
the other mereological relations such as ‘overlap’, ‘proper-parthood’ can be defined
directly in terms of parthood in the language we are considering—to take a simple
example, a is a proper part of b if and only if a and b are distinct and a is a part of b.7
Models for Lm are models for first-order logic with an added interpretation for the
parthood relation, and will be of the form of the form M¼ hD;Y; Ii. No issues
will arise out of our double usage ofY for both the parthood relation in our object
language and its interpretation in our models. The distinctive clause for truth in a
model M relative to a variable assignment l being:
M xYy½l () lðxÞYlðyÞ:
In particular we will be concerned with models for what is usually called ‘atomistic
classical extensional mereology’: the theory of the part-whole relation where
everything is composed out of mereological atoms, where every collection of
objects composes some object, and where mereologically complex objects with the
same proper parts (and thus the same atomic proper parts) are identical. Thus the
structures hD;Yi which we will be concerned with are all isomorphic to complete
atomic boolean algebras with their least element removed.
4.2 Infinitary Flexible First-Order Logic
The other language which we will be using here is slightly more exotic, deviating
from that of standard first-order logic in two main respects. Firstly, it has what are
referred to in Taylor and Hazen (1992) as flexible predicates. Secondly, it is an
7 Taking mereological composition as our primitive would complicate things slightly, requiring us to do
some preprocessing of formulas. The standard treatment of mereological composition, which can be seen
in Simons (1987), is where we have a primitive variable-binding term-forming operator ‘‘rxFx’’ for the
sum of the Fs. To treat this we first remove all occurrences of rxFx in favour of i-terms by replacing rxFx
by
ix8yðx  y  9zðFz ^ z  yÞÞ;
where ‘‘x  y’’ is overlap, which can be defined in terms of ‘‘Y’’ (Simons 1987, p. 37). We then remove
all such i-terms using Russell’s contextual elimination of definite descriptions, leaving us with a sentence
in Lm which we can then apply our translation to. Kit Fine’s characterisation of mereology (as being the
theory of sum operators which satisfy his conditions CLAP) in Fine (2010) can be dealt with similarly by
treating a term Rðx1; . . .; xnÞ just as the above pre-processing tells you to treat rxðx ¼ x1 _    _ x ¼ xnÞ.
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infinitary language: allowing infinite conjunctions, disjunctions and blocks of
quantifiers of the same kind. We will discuss each of these aspects of this language
in turn.
4.2.1 Flexible Predicates
In standard first-order logic, predicates are treated as having a fixed arity n,
combining with n terms to form a formula. One can generalise this situation by
allowing predicates to take any number of terms and produce a formula. Doing this
gives us multigrade predicates. Multigrade predicates are only really a generali-
sation of unary predicates, not allowing us to adequately express relations between
varying numbers of objects. Flexible predicates are a natural generalisation of both
standard (‘Fregean’) predicates, and multigrade predicates. Flexible predicates, like
standard Fregean predicates, have a fixed number of argument places; but each of
those argument places may be occupied by a variable number of terms. In more
formal terms we associate with each n-place flexible predicate R a type which is an
n-element sequence of pairs (called ‘place limitations’) telling us the minimum and
maximum number of terms which can be inserted into that argument position to
form a formula. So, for example, the flexible unary predicate ‘...live together’
requires at least two terms to form a formula—so ‘a live together’ is not well-
formed, while ‘a, b live together’ is.
The semantics of flexible predication is as one would expect. A flexible predicate
is true of some objects inserted into its various argument places in some particular
order (respecting that argument places place limitation) whenever those objects in
that order in those argument places are in the extension of the predicate. So, for
example, let us consider the predicate Between which we will take to be of type
h½1;x; ½1; 1; ½1; 1i—allowing any number of things to be between its second and
third arguments. In this case Betweenð2; 4; 6; 1; 7Þ will be true, as 2, 4, and 6 are
between 1 and 7.
Ultimately the use of flexible predicates here is a convenience which we could
dispense with by replacing each flexible predicate with a set of Fregean predicates
[for more details here see Taylor and Hazen (1992, p. 385)]. What the flexible
predicate do, though, is allow us to state things in a rather perspicuous manner,
without making any great presumptions about the nature or commitments of other
pieces of vocabulary.8
8 One might wonder why we are not using plural predicates and relations instead of flexible ones. Our
reason for this is simple: we take it that it would be more perspicuous to show that mereology is
ontologically innocent while presuming the ontological innocence of the minimum amount of other
primitives. One might reasonably expect that plural quantification is ontologically innocent (and indeed I
think that methods similar to those used below can be used to demonstrate as much), but it is hoped that
the innocence of mereology does not rest of the innocence of plural quantification. As flexible predicates
can simply be replaced by appropriate Fregean predicates and relations, they would seem to be as
innocent (ontologically speaking) as Fregean predicates themselves.
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4.2.2 Infinitary Devices
Given a first-order language L, the language Ljk (where j and k are infinite cardinals
such that j k) extends L by allowing conjunctions and disjunctions of cardinality
\j, and uniform blocks of quantifiers of length \k. More formally Ljk results
from L by adding sufficient variables to L so that the cardinality of the set of
variables is at least j.9 In particular we will be concerned with the language Lfx1x1
where Lf is the first-order language with flexible predicates described above. That is,
we are going to be concerned with the flexible predicate language where we are
allowed conjunctions, disjunctions and blocks of quantifiers of any size less than the
first uncountable ordinal. Models for Lfx1x1 are models hD; Ii for the flexible
predicate logic described above. We will use the same symbol to talk about infinite
and finite conjunctions and disjunctions. So, writing Mu½l for truth in M on l
of formulas u from Lfx1x1 we have clauses like the following:
M9x19x2   u½l () there is an assignment l0 differing at most on
x1; x2; . . . from l s.t. Mu½l0:
Mu1 _ u2 _    ½l () Mu1½l or Mu2½l or   
These infinitary devices are plausible candidates for being primitives which are
required in order to give a complete theory of the world.10 The idea here is that if we
want to produce a theory T which is a complete theory of the world (‘Reality’ as
Lewis says above) then one of the things which that theory would have to do is
place constraints upon the number of things which exist in the world. So it seems
that this theory T would have to entail that ‘there are at least n things’, where n is
the number of entities which exist in Reality. Now if there are denumerably many
entities (as we are supposing here that there are) then this would mean that T would
have to entail the following sentence:
9x1    9xn    ðx1 6¼ x2 ^    ^ x1 6¼ xn ^    ^ xn 6¼ xnþ1 ^   Þ
This is at least suggestive of the fact that a language like Lx1x1 is needed for giving a
complete description of the world. Given, then, that the project of showing that
mereology is ontologically innocent just is the project of showing that mereologically
complex objects are not needed in a complete theory of Reality (and thus plausibly not
part of Reality itself) the use of these primitives seems perfectly warranted.
5 The Translation
What we will do here is extend an idea proposed in Morton (1975) of translating
claims of the form ‘x is a cat’ (for example) as ‘x1; x2. . . make up a cat’ where the xi are
9 For further information on Infinitary Logic the interested reader should consult Bell (2012) and the
references therein.
10 Kit Fine gives similar motivating remarks for the use of infinitary modal languages in attempting to
simulate possibilist discourse in Fine (1977, p. 147).
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all mereological atoms. Morton does this by translating the language of mereology
into a language with multigrade predicates. One problem with Morton’s translation,
though, is that it is unclear how we are to translate predicates of arity[1, as Morton
only has primitive unary multigrade predicates, and his method of constructing
multigrade predicates out of standard predicates, the predicate-functor , gives the
wrong answers.11 For example according to Morton (1975), ‘John is married to Kate’
comes out as equivalent to ‘every atomic part of John is married to some atomic part of
Kate’, or perhaps ‘every atomic part of John is married to some atomic part of Kate’.
It’s not clear that this kind of distributive reading of relations between mereologically
complex individuals is always going to work—even if we allow a change in meaning
of the predicate in the non-mereological language (so we have ‘married’ instead of
‘married’).
On our approach a sentence like ‘John is married to Kate’ would be treated as
‘the atomic parts of John stand in the flexible relation marriedf to the atomic parts of
Kate’.12 It may be helpful to read many of the predicates Pf ð  Þ as ‘‘. . . are
arranged P-wise’’, and flexible relations Rf ð   ;HHHÞ as ‘‘   are related R-ly to
HHH’’. Thus ‘John is married to Kate’ becomes ‘the atomic parts of John are related
marriagely to the atomic parts of Kate’’. It is worth stressing at this point that the
relation marriedf has two argument places (the place limitation for both argument
places being h1;xi). This means, for example, that the atomic parts of John can
stand in this relation to the atomic parts of Kate, without the atomic parts of the
upper halves of John and Kate standing in the relation to their lower halves, as
would happen if we treated marriedf as a unary multigrade predicate in Morton’s
system.13 A perhaps more promising line, and one which is definitely more in tune
with the intended application of our translation procedure, is to think of flexible
predicates and relations as picking out a special kind of (most likely non-natural)
property. So, for example, we might think of the flexible predicate chairf as picking
out the flexible property the parts x1; x2; x3; . . . of an object standing in which is
sufficient for them to constitute a chair. This would make, in essence, our flexible
predicates be the linguistic correlates of the relations mentioned in the character-
isation of how to understand the idea of the features of a whole being nothing over
and above the features of its parts discussed in Sider (2007, p. 74), and mentioned in
the quote at the end of Sect. 2.
In addition to its clear debt to Morton’s translation, our translation also draws
quite direct inspiration from the translation mentioned by Go¨del in his discussion of
Russell’s ‘No-Class’ theory in Go¨del (1944), as well as similar translations
discussed in Fine (1977) and Quine (1947). Our translation s from the language Lm
to the language Lfx1x1 discussed above is as follows.
11 Morton’s translation also makes essential use of quantifiers over sequences of objects, making it
inappropriate for our task of showing that mereology is ontologically innocent.
12 Throughout we adopt a general convention of writing the flexible predicate associated with a given
predicate in the mereological language by superscripting it with an f . So, for example, the flexible binary
relation associated with a binary relation R from the mereological language will be written as Rf .
13 I would like to thank an anonymous referee for pushing me to clarify this point.
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sðRv1. . .vnÞ ¼ Rf xv11 ; xv12 ; . . .; . . . ; xvn1 ; xvn2 ; . . .
 
:
sð8vuÞ ¼ 8xv18xv2    sðuÞ:
sðvYuÞ ¼ 8x x ¼ xv1 _ x ¼ xv2 _   
  !
9y y ¼ xu1 _ y ¼ xu2 _   
  ^ x ¼ y :
sðv ¼ uÞ ¼ sðuYvÞ ^ sðvYuÞ:
Unpacking the above translation, we translate relations between individuals in the
mereological theory in terms of flexible relations amongst their atoms, universal
quantification in the mereological language is treated as universal quantification
over all possible collections of atoms, and ‘v is a part of u’ is translated as ‘every
atom of v is an atom of u’. So, for example, the formalisation of a sentence like
‘‘something is a cat’’—9xCatðxÞ—would become 9x19x2. . .Catf ðx1; x2; . . .Þ (e.g.
‘‘some atoms are arranged cat-wise’’ or ‘‘some atoms stand in the flexible cat-
constituting relation’’). Similarly, a sentence like ‘‘every cat has a part which is a
tail’’— 8xðCatðxÞ ! 9yðyYx ^ TailðyÞÞÞ—would become:











^ u ¼ v
 !!
^ Tailf ðy1; y2; . . .Þ
!#
That is to say, ‘‘for any atoms which stand in the flexible cat-constituting relation,
some of those atoms also stand in the flexible tail-constituting relation’’.
Using our translation we can show that everything which can be said in the
mereological language Lm can be said in the non-mereological language L
f
x1x1 .
More formally, given a model M of the mereological language which contains at
most denumerably many atoms, we define a unique model M	 of our non-
mereological language whose domain consists solely of mereological atoms, with a
flexible predicate Rf being true of the atomic parts of an object when, according to
M, their fusion stands in the relation R. We can think of this model as representing
the underlying ‘facts’ in virtue of which the statements of the mereological language
are true. We can see our translation, then, as mapping sentences u of the
mereological language, to statements sðuÞ in our language which does not contain
mereological primitives (making commitments to mereologically complex objects
thin ones). Formally speaking, this means that whenever u is true in M then sðuÞ is
true in M	. So, in particular, if M and M	 are intended models of Reality, our
translation will be truth preserving tout court (rather than simply ‘truth in a model’
preserving). We leave the full formal details of this to the Appendix.
692 R. French
123
6 Comparison with Other Translations
To give readers a clearer idea of how our translation works let us consider an
example treated in van Inwagen (1990, p. 109). There, van Inwagen paraphrases the
sentence ‘Some chairs are heavier than some tables’, as:14
There are xxs that are arranged chair wise and there are yys that are arranged
table wise and the xxs are heavier than the yys.
Our translation essentially applies a modified form of van Inwagen’s procedure
with plural quantification replaced by infinitary quantification over mereological
atoms, and van Inwagen’s plural predicates replaced by appropriate flexible
predicates. So, for example, the above sentence would be translated as
There are atoms x1; x2; . . . such that chair
f ðx1; x2; . . .Þ and there are atoms
y1; y2; . . . such that table
f ðy1; y2; . . .Þ and x1; x2; . . . are collectively heavier
than y1; y2; . . ..
One collection of problems with van Inwagen style paraphrases of mereological
talk are those concerning expressive power discussed in Uzquiano (2004). Uzquanio
points out that sentences like the following cannot be dealt with by standard, van
Inwagen style, translations which translate from the language of mereology into the
language of plural logic with plural predicates.
(1) The chairs outnumber the tables.
The main issue here is that the most natural translation of this sentence in the
language of mereology (extended by plural quantifiers) is simply, where xx and yy
are plural variables, and x
 xx means ‘‘x is one of the xx’’:
9xxð8xðx




This sentence, though, requires plural quantification over tables and chairs, and if
we were to naively apply the translation procedure advocated by van Inwagen then
we would end up needing plural collections of plural collections of atoms of chairs/
tables respectively. This highlights the first of the two problems which Uzquiano
poses for any attempt to ‘do away’ with talk of mereologically composite objects,
these being (i) how are we to explain plural quantification over composite objects,
and (ii) how are we to deal with plural predicates which are collectively satisfied by
complex objects.
In the obvious extension of our language by plural quantifiers and predicates
sentence (1) can be formalised as follows.
14 We have changed vanInwagen’s notation for plural variables to what is now considered standard. Here
plural variables are denoted as xx, yy, zz etc, with the plural extension of a given language adding plural
variables and quantifiers which bind them, as well as a new primitive predicate \\ which takes a
singular term in its first position and a plural term in its second, with x\\xx being read as ‘‘x is among
the xxs’’.
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The main thing worth noting here is that we have had to relativize our ‘outnum-
bering’ predicate to a pair of sortal terms (which determine what kinds of collec-
tions are meant to be outnumbering what other kinds of collections). This points
towards our general strategy for dealing with the second of Uzquino’s problems. In
general, the idea is that we can translate a collective predication P(xx) where the xx
are of complex objects of kind K in terms of the collective satisfaction of the plural
predicate PKðxx0Þ where the xx0 are all the simple parts of members of xx. In order
for a plurality of atoms xx to satisfy a predicate PK what is required, amongst other
things, is that the members of xx can be partitioned up into collections of simples
s1; . . .; sn; . . . s.t. K
f ðs1; . . .; sn; . . .Þ. Depending on the predicate P, other conditions
will need to be met by the xxs. Sometimes there will be illuminating things which
can be said about what those additional conditions may be. For example, for the
predicate outnumberchair;table to be satisfied by pluralities of atoms xx and yy we
require:
• The xx can be partitioned into collections of simples which satisfy chairf
• The yy can be partitioned into collections of simples which satisfy tablef
• There is a function f from members of xx to sets s of members of yy s.t.
– for every x
 xx, and enumeration s1; . . .; sn; . . . of f(x) we have
tablef ðs1; . . .; sn; . . .Þ
– for all a1; . . .; an; . . . in xx if chair
f ða1; . . .; an; . . .Þ then f ðaiÞ ¼ f ðajÞ
• There is no similar function from members of yy to sets of members of xx (with
tablef and chairf swapped as imagined)
There will be situations, though, where we cannot provide illuminating further
conditions (aside from partition conditions) which need to be met by a collection of
simples to be satisfied by a flexible plural predicate. So, for example, consider the
case of the predicate ‘touching one another’ in the following sentence.
(2) Some bricks are touching one another.
In this case there is nothing particularly illuminating we can say about what it
takes for some atoms xx to satisfy touchingbrick aside from that they must be able to
be partitioned into collections which satisfy brickf . This is mostly because the kind
of arrangement which atoms must stand in in order to be constitute some touching
bricks isn’t readily specifiable.
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A similar proposal is discussed in Uzquiano (2004, p. 447), according to which
we translate predicates which are collectively satisfied by a plural argument, like
‘touching one another’ in ‘‘Some bricks are touching one another’’, in terms of
predicates like ‘brick-touching-one-another’, where BRICK-TOUCHING-ONE-AN-
OTHER(xx) is true iff the members of xx can be partitioned up into a collection of
sets ss, the members of each set being arranged brick-wise, such that the ss are
touching one another. This approach is found wanting by Uzquiano because it treats
sentences like (2) as being ‘about’ sets, it makes it too easy for (2) to be true, and
according to it the translation of (2) doesn’t entail the translation of ‘‘There are
bricks’’. Our proposal, not involving sets in any manner, does not fall afoul of the
first objection here, and on a plausible account of the behaviour of infinitary
quantification the appropriate translation of (2) will entail the translation of ‘‘There
are bricks.’’ This leaves Uzquano’s third criticism, which (even in the case he is
considering) appears to depend on the atoms which make up the two halves of a
brick being arranged brick-wise. If this is the case then, plausibly, the mereological
sum of half a brick is a brick (these being the kinds of facts which predicates of
arrangement are intended to track), in which case our translation will track what the
defender of classical extensional mereology would say about such a case. This being
our aim, we can dispense with this objection.15
In this section our approach has merely been to show that our strategy does not
fall afoul of Uzquano’s expressive power worries, and in the process to sketch how
our approach could be extended to languages which also contained plural
quantification.
7 Innocence Gained
The ontological commitments of a theory are the constraints it places upon world
concerning what entities there are (cf. Rayo 2007). The worry of the person who
thinks that mereology is not ontologically innocent is that it places additional
constraints upon the world concerning what entities there are: forcing there to be not
only cats, but also cat-fusions, not just cats and mice, but also cat–mouse-fusions
like Tom-and-Jerry. What the above translation shows, though, is that all atomistic
classical mereology commits us too (in the thick sense) is the existence of
mereological atoms. Speaking more precisely, what we take the aforementioned
translation result to show is that we can characterise the portions of reality which
contain mereologically complex objects solely in terms of their parts and the various
flexible relations which they stand in—so that ultimately, in the absence of gunk,
the world can be characterised completely in terms of mereological atoms and the
various flexible relations which they stand in.16 Moreover, our translation suggests a
15 This may simply suggest to the reader that this is (perhaps yet another way) in which Classical
Extensional Mereology gets things wrong. Our aim here, though, it not to defend classical extensional
mereology against all attacks, rather it is merely to explain how it might be considered to be ontologically
innocent.
16 This may not be the most perspicuous way to represent the way the world is in fundamental terms,
though, especially if one holds, as Lewis did, that the fundamental relations are those that would appear in
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way of understanding Lewis’ claim that mereological relations are like identity. On
the above account ‘parthood’ is like identity in the sense that every statement of
parthood in a mereological language can be treated as a statement in the flexible-
infinitary language as a complex identity statement between the parts of the objects
involved. Given that all of the mereological relations can be defined in terms of
parthood, it follows that (in a perhaps somewhat extended sense) mereological
relations are like identity. Furthermore, and more importantly, the above transla-
tions also show how facts about mereological fusions can be explained in terms of
facts about the things fused.
8 Whither Nihilism?
Our formal results require that we are considering atomistic classical extensional
mereology. This may lead one to, quite reasonably, believe that we are committed to
there being mereological atoms, at which point our view looks quite a lot like
mereological nihilism—the translation above illustrating how to paraphrase away
talk of mereologically complex objects. One reason for this appearance could be the
reaction that, in the face of mereological atomism, the dispute between nihilists and
universalists appears to look somewhat insubstantial (Putnam 1987, p. 70). These
appearances are, I think, deceptive, especially in the current case.
Falling into the above temptation requires one to understand the above results as
showing that, if our assumption No Gunk is true, then the nihilist can say
everything which the mereological universalist can (our translation indicating how
this can be done). After all, as I explained above, the present approach does look
quite a lot like van Inwagen’s paraphrasing away of talk of composite objects, with
his plural quantification being cashed out in terms of infinitary quantification, and
his plural predicates replaced with flexible predicates and relations between
mereological atoms.17
This comparison only gets off the ground if the atoms in our mereological model
correspond to objects which have no proper parts (henceforth atoms), and there is
no need for this to be the case. There are all sorts of reasons to be interested in the
objects which we can construct out of a given collection of objects. As is pointed out
Footnote 16 continued
a completed fundamental physics. In this case we would expect the various flexible predicates and
relations to be defined (in a not necessarily uniform manner) in terms of those relations. This would make
the relationship between a description in terms of mereological atoms and flexible relations and one in
terms of mereological fusions and ‘standard’ relations much like the relationship between a description of
a system given in biological terms, and one given in microbiological or chemical terms.
17 Once we draw the distinction between thick and thin commitments the dispute between nihilists and
universalists becomes slightly more complicated, depending on the manner in which the nihilist is
denying a commitment to mereologically complex objects. For the nihilist position to truly be
incompatible with the universalist position being argued for here they would have to claim that we are not
thinly committed to mereologically complex objects, and thus object either to the claim that both Lm and
Lfx1x1 are equally ontologically revealing, or our characterisation of thick and thin commitments given
above. What this definitely does seem to illustrate is that, even if our assumption No Gunk is true the
dispute between nihilists and universalists is still a substantial one.
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in Fine (1991), there is no need for the basic objects in our ontology to be the ones
which cannot be generated using our various ‘constructors’ from other objects—the
example that Fine uses to make this point being particularly relevant to our
purposes.18
A more significant example concerns a universe of indefinitely divisible
matter of certain basic kinds. Any uniform piece of matter will then be the
aggregate of smaller pieces of matter. But all the same, it is reasonable to
suppose that the uniform pieces of matter are all basic. They do not earn their
admission into the ontology as constructs, even though any one of them might
have been regarded as a construct (Fine 1991, p. 266).
So one way we can conceive of the atoms of our mereological model is as some
collection of objects which we’ve singled out as basic, with our mereology allowing
us to talk about those objects and their fusions. Thinking of our atoms in this way,
what our results show is that anything which we can say about fusions of our basic
objects we can say directly about the basic objects themselves in a sufficiently
expressive languages without committing ourselves to the existence of any further
objects.
If the world is gunky then there is a very natural place where we might look for
such basic objects. Instead of thinking of our atomistic mereological theory as
modelling the full mereological structure of the world, thus making its atoms just be
atoms, we could instead think of it as modelling the fundamental explanatory
structure of the world. Here the thought is that the mereological atoms in our
mereological theory (and thus the entities in the domain of quantification for our
Lfx1x1 -models) are the smallest entities needed in order to tell a complete story about
Reality. Now these entities may be gunky, so long as their parts play no (or at least
no substantive) role in explanation. Schaffer, talking about the inference from the
postulation of particles in a completed microphysics, to the conclusion that the
particles are mereological atoms says the following:
That the particles are postulated by a complete microphysics shows only that
one can tell a complete causal story with particles as protagonists. But one can
tell a complete causal story with divisible protagonists, provided that the
divisions are boring, in that the characteristic properties of all the parts
supervene on the characteristic properties of their wholes (Schaffer 2003,
p. 505).
Adopting this idea, then, the results above can be used to show that mereology is
ontologically innocent, even in the presence of atomless gunk, so long as there is
some fundamental supervenience base, which consists of objects which are either
atoms or are boring in the sense described above.
18 Fine (1991) divides ontologies into their basic elements, constructors, and their elements. So, in the
case of (pure) set-theory the basic elements will be the empty set, the constructor the set-building
operation fg, and the elements all of the pure sets. In the mereological case things are not so clear,
though—as we highlight here. Obviously our constructor will be the operation of mereological fusion, but
what the basic objects are is somewhat less obvious.
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At this point we should qualify the statement we gave in Sect. 2 of what is
required for mereology to be ontologically innocent. Under the assumption of No
Gunk what is required for the ontological innocence of mereology according to
INNOCENCE is that talk of mereologically complex objects can be cashed out (via a
translation) in terms of talk about mereological atoms. It could well be, though, that
the fundamental supervenience base in fact involves composite objects of some
kind. In this case, then, there is a sense in which we can show that mereology is
ontologically innocent in a more extended sense. In this more extended sense, what
is required is that mereology brings with is no additional ontological commit-
ments—i.e. that the atoms of our mereological models are those which we are
antecedently committed to. Thinking of ontological innocence in this more extended
sense appears to be the best way of making sense of the talk in Lewis (1991, p. 82)
of mereology being innocent because it brings with it no further ontological
commitments, that it ‘‘commits us only to things ... [that] we were committed to
before’’. In the case where No Gunk is false, but we have a fundamental
supervenience base of boring objects, we can claim an (admittedly qualified) kind of
ontological innocence for mereology. If we are constructing a total metaphysical
theory we are antecedently committed to the objects which appear in the
fundamental supervenience base (be they atomic or composite), as they and the
properties they stand in underwrite all truths. The addition of mereological
primitives adds no further commitment over and above this. So in this sense, then,
mereology would not be innocent regarding the existence of mereologically
complex objects, but rather it would be innocent concerning the existence of
mereologically complex objects which are not part of the fundamental superve-
nience base.
9 Revisiting Our Assumptions
What we have shown is that there is good reason to think that mereology is
ontologically innocent, the seemingly extra (thick) ontological commitments of
mereology to fusions over and above the things fused being simply a result of
mereology encoding underlying commitments to the things fused in a manner which
we can avoid by using more extensive expressive devices. Our discussion above was
still relative to the number of assumptions we made in Sect. 2. In the previous
section we have already discussed how we can at least weaken, if not lift entirely,
the assumption of No Gunk. We will now return to our other assumptions, where
the situation is largely much simpler.
Lifting the assumption Worldbound requires us to make a stand on a number of
issues largely orthogonal to the present discussion. One formal way of doing this
which would retain some degree of neutrality is to work in terms of an extensional
theory of possible worlds such as Lewis’s (1968) counterpart theory. Here the idea
would be to consider an extension of the first-order mereological theory so that we
also have all the distinguished predicates of counterpart theory (most importantly
the counterpart relation), and so in our infinitary flexible first-order language we
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would end up with a corresponding flexible counterpart relation between the atoms
of individuals in different worlds.
The restriction on the size of our mereological models (e.g. considering only
models which have at most denumerably many mereological atoms) was purely one
of convenience, allowing us to deal with an extension the more familiar looking
infinitary language Lx1x1 . All we would need to do in order to deal with larger
models is to alter the infinitary part of our language appropriately. One option would
be to simply work in terms of the language L11 which allows blocks of quantifiers
and infinite conjunctions/disjunctions of arbitrary size.
There is one other assumption which we have not made explicitly above, but
which it is worth keeping in mind here. Our original statement of INNOCENCE
concerned theories such as classical extensional mereology, but our formal results
(of necessity) concern a particular regimentation of that theory. In order for our
formal results to show that mereology is indeed ontologically innocent according to
INNOCENCE above we are implicitly assuming that this presentation is faithful in the
relevant respects to classical extensional mereology. In particular one commitment
which we have incurred (which have have aimed to partially address in Sect. 6) is
that formal results like those we appeal to will hold in regimentations of classical
extensional mereology with different expressive resources. It is classical extensional
mereology itself which we claim is ontologically innocent, not merely any particular
formal regimentation of it.19
10 Conclusion
Lewis was right to think that there was an intimate relation between mereological
primitives and identity—in describing the ultimate furniture of reality mereological
talk ends up only placing requirements on reality concerning the identity and
distinctness of the objects: be they mereological atoms, various objects which we
are taking as givens in our ontological theorising, or perhaps the elements of the
fundamental supervenience base. I suspect my argument for this conclusion is
perhaps not one Lewis himself would have favoured, but I think it lends stronger
support to the notion than his argument by analogy. The cats and the cat fusions
really are the same portion of reality, just as Lewis said.
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Technical Appendix
In this appendix we will go over the technical results which are at the heart of this
paper in more detail.
Languages
The Mereological Language
Let Lm be a first-order language with denumerable supply of predicates
Pn1; . . .;P
n
n; . . . of each arity n, denumerably many variables v1; . . .; vn; . . ., the
universal quantifier ‘8’, identity ‘¼’, the boolean connectives ‘^’ and ‘:’, and a
distinguished binary relation ‘Y’ for parthood. The existential quantifier and other
boolean connectives are defined as usual.
Models for Lm are structures hD;Y; Ii where hD;Yi is isomorphic to the
structure hS;i where S ¼ }ðXÞ n ; and X is the set of minimal elements of D
relative to Y. Truth of a formula u of Lm in a model M¼ hD;Y; Ii on an
assignment of elements of D to free-variables l (written ‘‘M u½l’’) is defined
inductively as follows.
M Pv1. . .vn½l () hlðv1Þ; . . .; lðvnÞi 2 IðPÞ:
M vi ¼ vj½l () lðviÞ ¼ lðvjÞ:
M viYvj½l () lðviÞYlðvjÞ:
M :u½l () M 6 u½l:
M u ^ w½l () M  u½l and M w½l:
M 8viu½l () M  u½l0 for all l0
which differ from l at most on vi:
The Flexible Infinitary Language
The language Lfx1x1 is a first-order language with a denumerable supply of flexible
predicates Pf
n
1; . . .;P
f n
n; . . . of each arity n, an uncountable supply of variables xi
(ix1), the universal quantifier ‘8’, identity ‘¼’, conjunction ‘^’, disjunction ‘_’
and negation ‘:’. Recall that a flexible predicate forms formulas by putting
sequences of terms in its argument places the size of which are bounded by its
place-limitation.
A place-limitation ‘ is a pair ½i; a where i is a natural number, and a is an ordinal,
with i being the lower limit of ‘ and a being the upper limit of ‘, which we will
denote respectively by llð‘Þ and ulð‘Þ. The type of a flexible predicate F of degree n
is then a sequence h‘1; . . .; ‘ni of place-limitations.
The formation rules for Lfx1x1 are as follows.
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• If Pf is an n-ary flexible predicate with place limitation h‘1; . . .; ‘ni, and
x11; . . .; x
1
i1
; . . .; xn1; . . .; x
n
in
are variables where each ij is an ordinal less that ulð‘jÞ
then Pf ðx11; . . .; x1i1 ; . . .; xn1; . . .; xninÞ is a formula.
• If xi and xj are variables then xi ¼ xj is a formula.
• If u and w are formulas then so are u ^ w, u _ w and :u.
• If u1; . . .;un; . . . is a sequence of formulas of length \x1 then u1 _    _ un _
   and u1 ^    ^ un ^    are formulas.
• If u is a formula and xi a variable then 8xiu is a formula.
• If x1; . . .; xn; . . . is a sequence of variables of length \x1 none of which occur
bound in u then 8x1    8xn   u and 9x1    9xn   u are formulas.
A model for Lfx1x1 is a structure hD; Ii where D is a non-empty set, and I a first-order
interpretation function which meets to following constraint: for all flexible
predicates F of type h‘1; . . .; ‘ni the interpretation I of our models for Lfx1x1 assigns
a set of n-tuples hs1; . . .; sni s.t. for all i where 1 i n:
(i) each si is a sequence of elements of D,
(ii) llð‘iÞ lengthðsiÞ ulð‘iÞ.
Truth of a formula u of Lfx1x1 in a model M¼ hD; Ii on an assignment of elements
of D to free variables l (written ‘‘Mu½l’’) is defined inductively as follows,
where x~i is an abbreviation for x1; . . .; xi.
MPf x1~i1 ; . . .; xn~in
 
½l () l xn~i1
 D E
; . . .; l xn~in
 D ED E
2 I Pf :
M xi ¼ xj½l () lðxiÞ ¼ lðxjÞ:
M:u½l () M1u½l:
Mu ^ w½l () Mu½l and Mw½l:
M8xu½l () Mu½l0 for all l0
which differ from l at most on x:
M 8x1    8xn   u½l () for all assignments l0 differing at most
on x1. . .xn. . . from l: Mu½l0:
Mu1 _    _ un _    ½l () Mu1½l or    Mun½l or   
Translation Proofs
For our translation we assume that there is a injective function g between n-ary
predicates of Lm and n-place flexible predicates of L
f
x1x1 whose place limitations are
h½1;x; . . .; ½1;xi. We note this by writing in our translation Rf to pick out the
predicate gðRÞ where R is a predicate from Lm to save clutter.
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sðRv1. . .vnÞ ¼ Rf ðxv11 ; xv12 ; . . . ; . . . ; xvn1 ; xvn2 ; . . .Þ:
sð8vuÞ ¼ 8xv18xv2    sðuÞ:
sðvYuÞ ¼ 8x

ðx ¼ xv1 _ x ¼ xv2 _   Þ !
9yððy ¼ xu1 _ y ¼ xu2 _   Þ ^ x ¼ yÞ

:
sðv ¼ uÞ ¼ sðuY vÞ ^ sðvY uÞ:
In order to determine whether a given object in the models for our mereological
language is an atom we will find it useful to use the unary predicate AtomðxÞ, which
is defined as
AtomðxÞ ¼Def 8zðzYx! z ¼ xÞ:
That is to say, an object x is a mereological atom if its only part is itself. Given a
model hD;Y; Ii an an a 2 D let:
Atomic-PartsðaÞ ¼ fai 2 DjAtomðaiÞ & aiYag:
Definition 1 Given a model for atomistic classical mereology M¼ hD;Y; Ii let
M	 ¼ hD	; I	i be defined as follows.
• D	 := fa 2 Dja 2 IðAtomÞg.
• I	ðRÞ := fhAPða1Þ; . . .;APðanÞi : ha1; . . .; ani 2 IðRÞ where APðaiÞ is an
enumeration of Atomic-PartsðaiÞ.
This puts us in the position of being able to state our main result.
Theorem 2 For all models of atomistic classical mereology M¼ hD;Y; Ii with
at most denumerably many atoms there is a unique model M	 ¼ hD	; I	i s.t. for
all sentences u in the mereological language we have the following:
M u if and only if M	  sðuÞ:
In order to prove our main result we will first need to prove an auxiliary
proposition.
Definition 3 Given a model M¼ hD;Y; Ii and assignment l for Lm and a model
M	 ¼ hD	; I	i and an Lfx1x1 assignment l0 say that l and l0 atom-agree on u for
u 2 Lm whenever, for all free-variables vi in u we have
l0ðxvij Þ ¼ aj
where aj is the j-th member of an enumeration of Atomic-PartsðlðviÞÞ if




What this means is that whenever we have two variable assignments l and l0
which atom agree on an Lm-formula u then we know that if v is free in u then the
variables xv1; . . .; x
v
i ; . . . will be assigned on l
0 all and only the atomic parts of the
object lðvÞ.
Proposition 4 For all u 2 Lm, all models M¼ hD;Y; Ii with at most denumer-
ably many atoms and all assignments l:
M u½l ()M	  sðuÞ½l0
where l and l0 atom-agree.
Proof By induction on the complexity of u. We treat the most interesting cases
here, that in the basis case where u ¼ vYu and that in the inductive step where
u ¼ 8vw for some w of lesser complexity that u. The other cases are either routine,
or in the case of identity a trivial modification of the Y case.
(Y): Suppose that M vYu½l. This is the case iff lðvÞYlðuÞ which is the
case iff Atomic-PartsðlðvÞÞ  Atomic-PartsðlðuÞÞ. For any l0 which atom-agrees
with l on u this means that

l0 xvi




 jl0ðxui Þ 2 Atomic-PartsðlðuÞÞ

:
This is the case iff
M	  8x x ¼ xv1 _ x ¼ xv2 _   
 ! 9y y ¼ xu1 _ y ¼ xu2 _   
  ^ x ¼ y  :½l0;
which is equivalent to M	  ssðvYuÞ½l0 as desired.
(8): suppose that M 8vw½l. Then for all l s.t. l and l agree on all variables
but v we have M w½l. So by the induction hypothesis we have M ssðwÞ½l0 
where l and l
0
atom-agree on w. By inspection of the translation, and the con-
struction of I	 it is easy to see that the particular enumeration used to show that l
and l
0
atom-agree on w does not effect the satisfiability of formulas of the form
sðwÞ, and thus in fact every enumeration e of the atomic parts of lðvÞ will give us
an assignment l
0
e which atom-agrees with l
 on w. Thus it follows that
M	 8xv18xv2    sðwÞ½l0 as required.
Suppose now that M	  8xv18xv2    sðwÞ½l0. Then for all assignments l00 which
are xv1; x
v
2; . . .-variants of l
0 we have that M	  sðwÞ½l00. So by the induction
hypothesis we have M w½l00 where l00 atom-agrees with l00 on w. But this
means M satisfies w for all v-variant assignments of the assignment l which atom-
agrees with l0—as whenever S is the smallest set SD	 s.t. for all i l00 ðxvi Þ 2 S we
have that l
00ðvÞ ¼ a where a is the object whose atomic parts are all and only those
in S. Thus we can conclude that M 8vw½l as desired. h
It is easy to see that our main theorem follows from the above proposition, being
the special case where u is a sentence.
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